Software Downloads
Current versions of NTP
Source Code Releases
RSS Feed for
Current releases of NTP
The NTP Reference Implementation is
Binary Releases
Information and other download links
Stable Release NEWS
NTP 4.2.8 (Harlan Stenn, 2014/12/18)
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
Severity: HIGH
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following high-severity vulnerabilities:
************************ vv NOTE WELL vv
***************************
The vulnerabilities listed below can be significantly mitigated by following the BCP of putting
restrict default ... noquery
in the
ntp.conf file. With the exception of:
-
receive() missing return on error - References: Sec 2670 / CVE-2014-9296 / VU#852879
below (which is a limited-risk vulnerability), none of the recent
vulnerabilities listed below can be exploited if the source IP is
restricted from sending a 'query'-class packet by your
ntp.conf file.
************************ ^^ NOTE WELL ^^
***************************
Weak default key in config_auth().
- References: [Sec 2665] / CVE-2014-9293 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
- Vulnerable Versions: all releases prior to 4.2.7p11
- Date Resolved: 28 Jan 2010
Summary
If no 'auth' key is set in the configuration file,
ntpd would generate a random key on the fly. There were two problems with this: 1) the generated key was 31 bits in size, and 2) it used the (now weak)
ntp_random() function, which was seeded with a 32-bit value and could only provide 32 bits of entropy. This was sufficient back in the late 1990s when the code was written. Not today.
Mitigation
Any of:
- Upgrade to 4.2.7p11 or later.
- Follow BCP and put
restrict ... noquery in your ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was noticed in ntp-4.2.6 by Neel Mehta of the Google Security Team.
Non-cryptographic random number generator with weak seed used by ntp-keygen to generate symmetric keys.
- References: [Sec 2666] / CVE-2014-9294 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
- Vulnerable Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.7p230
- Date Resolved: Dev (4.2.7p230) 01 Nov 2011
Summary
Prior to ntp-4.2.7p230
ntp-keygen used a weak seed to prepare a random number generator that was of good quality back in the late 1990s. The random numbers produced was then used to generate symmetric keys. In ntp-4.2.8 we use a current-technology cryptographic random number generator, either
RAND_bytes() from OpenSSL, or
arc4random().
Mitigation
Any of:
- Upgrade to 4.2.7p230 or later.
- Follow BCP and put
restrict ... noquery in your ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered in ntp-4.2.6 by Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
Buffer overflow in crypto_recv()
- References: Sec 2667 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
- Versions: All releases before 4.2.8
- Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary
When Autokey Authentication is enabled (i.e. the
ntp.conf file contains a 'crypto pw ...' directive) a remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious code to be executed with the privilege level of the
ntpd process.
Mitigation
Any of:
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later, or
- Disable Autokey Authentication by removing or commenting out all configuration directives beginning with the
crypto keyword in your ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
Buffer overflow in ctl_putdata()
- References: Sec 2668 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
- Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
- Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary
A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious code to be executed with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
Mitigation
Any of:
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
- Follow BCP and put
restrict ... noquery in your ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
Buffer overflow in configure()
- References: Sec 2669 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
- Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
- Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary
A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious code to be executed with the privilege level of the
ntpd process.
Mitigation
Any of:
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
- Follow BCP and put
restrict ... noquery in your ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
receive() missing return on error
- References: Sec 2670 / CVE-2014-9296 / VU#852879
- CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 5.0
- Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
- Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary
Code in
ntp_proto.c:receive() was missing a
return; in the code path where an error was detected, which meant processing did not stop when a specific rare error occurred.
We haven't found a way for this bug to affect system integrity.
If there is no way to affect system integrity the base CVSS score for this bug is 0.
If there is one avenue through which system integrity can be partially affected, the base score becomes a 5. If system integrity can be partially affected via all three integrity metrics, the CVSS base score become 7.5.
Mitigation
Any of:
* Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
* Remove or comment out all configuration directives beginning with the crypto keyword in your
ntp.conf file.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
See
https://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
New features / changes in this release:
Important Changes
Internal NTP Era counters
The internal counters that track the "era" (range of years) we are in
rolls over every 136 years'. The current "era" started at the stroke of
midnight on 1 Jan 1900, and ends just before the stroke of midnight on
1 Jan 2036.
In the past, we have used the "midpoint" of the range to decide which
era we were in. Given the longevity of some products, it became clear
that it would be more functional to "look back" less, and "look forward"
more. We now compile a timestamp into the ntpd executable and when we
get a timestamp we us the "built-on" to tell us what era we are in.
This check "looks back" 10 years, and "looks forward" 126 years.
ntpdc responses disabled by default
Dave Hart writes:
For a long time,
ntpq and its mostly text-based mode 6 (control)
protocol have been preferred over
ntpdc and its mode 7 (private
request) protocol for runtime queries and configuration. There has
been a goal of deprecating
ntpdc, previously held back by numerous
capabilities exposed by
ntpdc with no
ntpq equivalent. I have been
adding commands to
ntpq to cover these cases, and I believe I've
covered them all, though I've not compared command-by-command
recently.
As I've said previously, the binary mode 7 protocol involves a lot of
hand-rolled structure layout and byte-swapping code in both
ntpd and
ntpdc which is hard to get right. As
ntpd grows and changes, the
changes are difficult to expose via
ntpdc while maintaining forward
and backward compatibility between
ntpdc and
ntpd. In contrast,
ntpq='s text-based, =label=value approach involves more code reuse and
allows compatible changes without extra work in most cases.
Mode 7 has always been defined as vendor/implementation-specific while
mode 6 is described in RFC 1305 and intended to be open to interoperate
with other implementations. There is an early draft of an updated
mode 6 description that likely will join the other NTPv4 RFCs
eventually. (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-odonoghue-ntpv4-control-01)
For these reasons, ntpd 4.2.7p230 by default disables processing of
ntpdc queries, reducing =ntpd='s attack surface and functionally
deprecating
ntpdc. If you are in the habit of using
ntpdc for certain
operations, please try the
ntpq equivalent. If there's no equivalent,
please open a bug report at
https://bugs.ntp.org./
In addition to the above, over 1100 issues have been resolved between
the 4.2.6 branch and 4.2.8. The ChangeLog file in the distribution
lists these.
Complete NEWS file
Complete Change Log
About the NTP Reference Implementation Source Releases
The
NTP (R&D) Project only produces source code releases of The NTP Reference Implementation; users needing precompiled versions of NTP should see the
links page. These releases may be installed using the standard Unix
make command in conjunction with a compiler and all necessary libraries.
Please contact your operating system vendor for binary packages or assistance with your package-management system.
The
NTP version numbering page explains the version numbering scheme.
Browsing the Archives from the NTP (R&D) Project at www.ntp.org
Tarballs for production and development versions of The NTP Reference Implementation are available from the:
Obsolete versions of The NTP Reference Implementation are available from:
The
NTP Public Services Project HTTP archive proxy is
Ports to other operating systems
Third-party implementations, including pre-compiled versions for operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, and some ports of the NTP package are linked to on the
links page.
Receiving Notifications about new releases
Please visit
ReleaseNotifications for more information about the many options available for receiving notifications about new NTP releases.
png 
Copyright &© 1999-2021 by the contributing authors. All material on this collaboration platform is the property of the contributing authors. Ideas, requests, problems regarding the site? Send feedback